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A Discursive Essay on the Nature of Marriage
and Divorce in Italy and the United States
ROBERT E. RAiNS*
GIANLUCA BENEDETTI**
i. INTRODUCTION.
As challenges to the notion that marriage is reserved to members of the oppo-
site sex have been increasing in the judicial, legislative and popular arenas over
the past decade in the Western World, our basic concept of marriage has been,
depending on one's point of view, diminished or expanded. Society defines
marriage in various spheres simultaneously: legal, economic, social, moral, eth-
ical and religious (or non-religious, which is nevertheless a statement about
religion).
There are, in truth, three temporal time frames, at which society makes and
constantly remakes critical decisions that shape this fundamental institution:
point of entry (who may marry whom, and how), during marriage (which may,
in turn, actually be divided in many cases between the time a married couple
cohabits and the time(s), if any, during which they are separated and estranged,
but still married) and point of exit (dissolution, divorce, annulment or nullifica-
tion, or death of one of the parties).1 Any changes, however slight, in the rules
relating to any of these time frames (whether the altered rules relate only to the
spouses, or to their relationship with children of their union or children of either
of them, or to third parties) necessarily alters what it means to be married.
Without attempting to be exhaustive, this essay will compare and contrast
developments in Italian and American law in these arenas.
The reader must keep one important caveat in mind, however. While one can
speak with some certainty about Italian family law, American family law re-
mains fragmented. It is governed by the laws of the fifty states, notwithstand-
ing an increasing overlay of federal law. When the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (hereinafter, "NCCUSL") was founded
in 1892, it was suggested that one of the major subjects for a uniform act would
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1. Additionally, especially where a marriage has produced children who are minors when their par-
ents divorce, society fashions and refashions rules that continue to regulate the parties in various ways,
often long after a marriage is terminated.
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be marriage and divorce. A mere seventy-eight years later, the NCCUSL
promulgated a proposed Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (hereinafter,
"UMDA"). Today, over three decades later, only eight (8) states have adopted
some form of the UMDA. 2 Thus generalizations about the status of American
family law are only that: generalizations. To the extent that the authors purport
to make such generalizations, they are surely subject to valid dispute in many
instances.
II. ENTRY INTO MARRIAGE.
A. THE ITALIAN PERSPECTIVE.
As in any other legal system, according to Italian law, no marriage celebra-
tion can validly take place unless the individual holds full capacity for marriage.
Marriage is defined as the legal union between a man and a woman, therefore
both same sex and polygamous marriages are not allowed.
3
The minimum age of capacity to marry is eighteen, but Article 84 of the Civil
Code states that the minor may be authorized by the Tribunal to enter into mar-
riage if the following requirements are satisfied: (a) he or she is at least sixteen;
(b) there exist "serious reasons" to grant the authorization; and (c) the minor is
"mature" both from a psychological and a physical point of view.4
The other main requirement is competence which, after the reform brought
about by the law of 19 May 1975, is considered only from a psychological
perspective.5 In order to enter into a valid marriage, an individual must hold an
adequate degree of discretionary judgment, and he or she must be capable to
freely determine whether or not to get married. For example, a person who has
attempted to kill or actually did kill a spouse of either party is not allowed to
marry the other spouse.6 In addition, the Code also envisages consanguinity
restrictions between ascendant relatives, descendant relatives, siblings and other
close relatives.7
There are also other legal requirements - the so-called formalities. A viola-
tion of the formalities does not render the marriage invalid; however, it might
2. See UNmoR MARRIAGE AND DrvoRcE ACT (U.LA.), Preparatory Note (1998).
3. Mhauo BEsSONE, GIJRIsPRUDEN7ZA DEL DBUTro DI FAMnOLIA 11 (5" ed. 1995). See, C.c. art. 86
(Italy Codiice Civil); see Judgment of Rome Court of June 28, 1980, reproduced in I GURIsPRuJDFNZA
ITALIANA 170 2, 1982) (dismissing the petition of a same-sex couple to be allowed to marry by hold-
ing that, "marriage is the lasting union between a man and a woman, regulated by the law.").
4. See C.c. art. 84,
5. As a matter of fact, under Article 123 of the Italian Civil Code, which was repealed by the 1975
bill, impotence and sterility rendered the marriage invalid, and thus the concerned person was incapable
of getting married. C.c. art. 123 (Mario Beltrano, et a]. trans., Oceana Publications, 1969). See Lipari,
Delle condizioni necessarie per contrarre matrimonio, reproduced in COMMENTARIO ALLA RiFORMA
DEL DIRITro i FAMIGLtA, A CURA DI CARRARO, OePo a TiAauccm 85 (1977).
6. C.c. art. 88.
7. C.c. art. 87.
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subject the party that does not comply with them to criminal punishment.
Under Italian law there are three fundamental formalities, two directly dealing
with a woman's marriage and one regarding a woman's remarriage. Specifi-
cally, the formalities are: a period of public notice before the commencement of
the marriage; government registration upon marriage; and satisfaction of the
waiting period before a remarriage
The first formality is in place in order to allow "interested parties"" to file an
opposition, alleging that a legal impediment exists to a projected marriage.9
Article 93 of the Italian Civil Code requires that the future spouses give public
notice of their intention to marry.'0 If an opposition is filed before the Tribunal,
no marriage celebration can take place until the opposition is dismissed.
The second formality relating to the governmental registration of a marriage
is governed by Article 107 of the Italian Civil Code. This article states that the
officer of vital statistics must inform the spouses about the fundamental rights
and duties arising out of marriage by reading Articles 143, 144 and 147 of the
Italian Civil Code; and after each spouse has expressed his or her willingness to
enter into marriage, the officer must then declare that the parties are legally
married.11 At this point, the act of the marriage's registration, which is merely
intended to inform the community that the marriage was celebrated, will follow.
The third formality, implemented by Article 89 of the Italian Civil Code, is in
place in order to prevent the risk of the so-called "confusion of paternity." Spe-
cifically, Article 89 provides that a previously married woman cannot remarry
unless three hundred days have expired since her divorce or the marriage's an-
nulment, unless her former marriage was declared invalid because of either
spouse's impotence or infertility. The Tribunal may grant a dispensation from
this requirement if the woman can demonstrate that she is not pregnant, or if
there is conclusive evidence that during the above three hundred day period the
woman did not cohabit with her spouse. If the woman does not comply with
this requirement, and thus gets married before the indicated time period, she is
subject to criminal punishment, namely a fine.12
8. C.c. art. 102.
9. However, an author pointed out the complex and time-consuming publication procedure is also
directed to warn the prospective spouses about the importance of the matrimonial bond. ANDREA ToR-
RErNI & PreRo SC SiNGER, MANUAi Di Dimyrro IuvATo 828 (Giuffr6, 1981). [hereinafter ToR-
RNTE, MANaUALE].
10. See FRANcEsCO GAZZONi, MANUALZ i Dmrro PRIVATO 327 (ESI ed., 2001).
11- If the officer failed to officially declare that the parties were united in marriage, the bond must
be considered valid as long as he or she actually received both spouses' nuptial declaration and duly
reported in the act of marriage that the exchange of consent took place. MAsSimo BIANCA, Diurro
Civwe 49 (2d ed. 1985). The opposite conclusion is presented by another doctrinal point of view,
which considers the officer's declaration to be an essential legal requirement to a valid civil marriage.
ToRariNrr, MANuALE, supra note 10, at 830-
12. C.c. art. 89.
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Following the Concordat of 1929, the Italian State (then a fascist state) and
the Holy See agreed that religious marriages would have "civil effects" (i.e. be
considered valid and binding by the State too) as long as two fundamental re-
quirements are fulfilled: (a) the minister must remind the parties that the mar-
riage will be considered valid by the Italian State and, as we have seen with
reference to civil marriage, the minister must read articles 143, 144 and 147 of
the Italian Civil Code; and (b) after the marriage celebration, the minister must
send the "act of marriage" to the officer of vital statistics, who will proceed to
its registration.13
Similar to civil marriage, the Concordat marriage must be preceded by the
completion of the public notice procedure, which takes place before both the
religious and civil authorities. The purpose of this is to allow a concerned party
to follow the opposition procedure described above. In contrast to a civil mar-
riage, where the registration is considered a formality, the registration in a Con-
cordat marriage is an essential requirement for the marriage's validity vis-a-vis
the Italian State. It should also be noted that the Concordat marriage registra-
tion cannot take place if one of the above indicated essentials is lacking. If the
registration is performed, the Concordat marriage is considered "civilly" valid
from the time its celebration actually took place - not from the time of the
registration itself.
14
B. THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE.
Despite recent challenges, the American legal rules for entry into marriage
have evolved only incrementally in the last hundred years. There has been a
gradual abatement of affinity prohibitions and, to a lesser extent, a reduction of
consanguinity restrictions.15 During the Twentieth Century, several states aban-
doned, either by legislation or judicial decree, the doctrine of "Common Law"
marriage.16 That relic of frontier times continues in place (but not in a place of
honor) in roughly ten states, including Pennsylvania,17 where state courts have
repeatedly said that the doctrine is to be tolerated, not encouraged.18
13. See AccoRDo Di RuvIsIONE DEL CONCORDATO LATERANENSE, February 18, 1984, It.-Holy See,
art. 8 n., enacted in Italy by Law no. 121 of March 20, 1985.
14. The above-described "retroactive effect" of marriage registration occurs even when the registra-
tion itself is requested a second time and no essential requirement is lacking. TomcrNTE, MANVALE,
supra note 10, at 843.
15. MARY ANN GLENDON, Tim TRANsFosmAToN OF LAW 56 (1989).
16. Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 ORE-
CON L. REv. 709, 715 n.24 (1996).
17. Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016 (Pa. 1998).
18. "Because claims for the existence of a marriage in the absence of a certified ceremonial marriage
present a 'fruitful source of perjury and fraud,' Pennsylvania courts have long viewed such claims with
hostility, see In re Estate of Wagner, 398 Pa. 531, 533, 159 A.2d 495, 497 (1960). Common law
marriages are tolerated, but not encouraged. Id. While we do not today abolish common law marriages
in Pennsylvania, we reaffirm that claims for this type of marriage are disfavored." Id. at 1019-20.
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In the last third of the Twentieth Century, the United States Supreme Court
issued several significant constitutional rulings affecting the ability of states to
regulate marriage. Utilizing the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court
struck down an embarrassing relic of the Nineteenth Century, the so-called
"miscegenation" laws that still lingered on in sixteen southern states until
1967.19 These laws prohibited persons of different races from marrying each
other. Remarkably, it was not until November 2000 that the last hold-out state,
Alabama, actually repealed its unenforceable miscegenation statute.20
The Supreme Court also decided two cases involving the impact of poverty
on marriage. In one, the Court struck down a Wisconsin statute that prohibited
the issuance of a marriage license to a person who had a child out of wedlock
who was not in that person's custody, and for whom that person was in arrears
in child support or the child was a "ward of the state." This legislation was
targeted at "deadbeat dads." The Court held that the regulation was not suffi-
ciently tailored to the governmental purposes involved.21 Similarly, but ironi-
cally in a case involving divorce, the Court struck down mandatory filing and
service fees in divorce actions, as applied to indigent married persons, on the
grounds that this prevented remarriage.22
Subsequently, the Court struck down a state's prison regulations requiring
inmates to obtain permission from the prison superintendent before getting mar-
ried.23 The Court distinguished an earlier summary affirmation of a decision
upholding a state law prohibiting prisoners serving life sentences from getting
married.
24
Toward the end of the Twentieth Century, litigation was brought in a number
of American jurisdictions which some perceived as attacking the very founda-
tions of marriage. We refer here of course to the various lawsuits challenging
explicit or implicit prohibitions on same-sex couples being married throughout
the United States.25 Particularly momentous were the decisions of the Hawaii
and Vermont Supreme Courts.26 In Baehr v. Lewin, the Hawaii Supreme Court
held that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action for violation of their rights
under the Hawaii Constitution and remanded the case for trial.27 In a more final
decision, that was nevertheless an incomplete victory for gay rights activists,
19. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. Alabama repeals century-old ban on interracial marriages, Cnn.com (November 8, 2000) avail-
able at http://www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLrMCS/stories/l1/07/alabama.interraciaV (last visited April
29, 2002).
21. Zabloeki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 371 (1971).
22. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
23. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
24. Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S. 953 (1974).
25. See generally, Robert F. Rains, The Evolving Status of Same-Sex Unions in Hawaii, Alaska,
Vermont and Throughout he United States, 4 CoNrwni. Issues IN LAW 71 (1999).
26. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
27. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
2002]
NAT'L ITALIAN AMERICAN BAR ASS'N JOURNAL
the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker v. State of Vermont ruled that denying
same-sex couples the benefits of marriage violated their rights under the Com-
mon Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution.28
After the Hawaii Supreme Court remanded the Baehr case for trial, Congress
and many state legislatures enacted "defense of marriage" acts, in an effort to
make clear their disapproval of same-sex marriage.2 9 Particularly notable is the
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which not only allows states to re-
fuse to give "full faith and credit" to same-sex marriages from other states,30 but
also for the first time purports to generally define marriage for federal pur-
poses.31 Outside of the arena of immigration, it had previously been thought
that the federal government would always defer to the determination under state
law as to whether a couple was legally married.32 Now if a state should allow
same-sex marriages, DOMA provides that those marriages will not be recog-
nized for any federal purposes.
To some extent congruent with this development, there has been the creation
of various quasi-marital statutes. These are in place, not only in a number of
major metropolitan centers, such as in New York City where domestic partners
are entitled to share various benefits,33 but also now at the statewide level. In
response to the Baehr litigation, the state of Hawaii now allows same-sex
couples to register as "reciprocal beneficiaries" with many of the same rights
and obligations as married couples.34 Similarly, in response to the Vermont
Supreme Court decision in Baker, the Vermont legislature has authorized same-
sex couples to enter into "civil unions," with essentially all of the rights and
duties of married couples in Vermont.3
5
A fascinating variation on the same-sex marriage controversy in recent years
has been the issue of determining the legal sex of a post-operative transsexual
for purposes of entry into marriage. The predominant Western view has been
that one maintains the legal gender that one was born with (which, in itself, is
28. Baker, 744 A.2d at 889. However, the Vermont Supreme Court stopped short of ordering that
same-sex couples be allowed to marry (as opposed to having all the rights of married persons). Id. at
886-89.
29. Defense of Marriage Act of 1998, Public Law 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419. See Henry J. Reskee, A
Matter of Full Faith, WL 82-JUL A.B.A. J., July 1996.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. V 2000).
31. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. V 2000).
32. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.344 (1979)("You may be eligible for [Social Security] benefits if you
are related to the insured person as a wife, husband, widow or widower. To decide your relationship to
the insured, we look first to State law.")
33. See HAYD N CURRY Er AL., A LEGAL Guava FoR LESBAN ANr GAY CoumIS 1-8 (9' ed.
1996).
34. 1997 Haw. Seas. Laws 383.
35. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2000).
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not always readily determinable).36 Nevertheless, as early as 1976, one state
intermediate appellate court upheld a trial court judgment that found that a
transsexual, who was born a male, and was both medically and legally trans-
formed into a female, by virtue of sex-reassignment surgery, was entitled to
support from her husband3 7 In 1999, a Texas appellate court followed the
dominant view that a sex change does not legally change one's gender. Accord-
ingly, the wife was still legally a male post-operatively, and thus, her marriage
to a man was void ab initio. Therefore, she was precluded from maintaining a
wrongful death action where the husband had died, allegedly as a result of med-
ical malpractice.
38
Yet another intermediate appellate court addressed this same subject in 2001.
The Court of Appeals of Kansas, in an extremely thorough opinion, concluded
that:
[a] trial court must consider and decide whether an individual was male or
female at the time the individual's license was issued and the individual was
married, not simply what the individual's chromosomes were or were not at
the moment of birth.
The court may use chromosome makeup as one factor, but not the exclusive
factor, in arriving at a decision....
[O1n remand, the trial court is directed to consider factors in addition to chro-
mosome makeup, including: gonadal sex, internal morphologic sex, external
morphologic sex, hormonal sex, phenotypic sex, assigned sex and gender of
rearing, and sexual identity. The listed criteria we adopt as significant in
resolving the case before us should not preclude the consideration of other
criteria as science advances.
39
In March 2002, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed and reinstated summary
judgment for the party challenging the validity of the marriage.40 The Court
acknowledged that, there are two distinct lines of cases- One judges the validity
of the marriage according to the sexual classification assigned to the transsexual
at birth. The other views medical and sexual procedures as a means of unifying
a divided sexual identity and determines the transsexual's sexual classification
for the p rpose of the marriage at the time of marriage.
41
According to the Court, the sole issue was the meaning of the following pro-
vision of the Kansas marriage law: The marriage contract is to be considered in
36. See Corbett v. Corbett, 2 W.L.R. 1306 2 ALL E.R. (P.D.A. 1970). See also Cossey v. United
Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990); Sheffield and Horsham v. United Kingdom, 1998-V Eur.
Ct. H.R. at 2011 (1998).
37. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 211 (N.J. Super. 1976).
38. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex.Ct.App.1999), cert. den. 531 U.S, 872 (2000).
39. In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086, 1110 (Kan.CLApp. 2001).
40. In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d t20 (Kan. 2002).
41 Id. at 124.
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law as a civil contract between two parties who are of opposite sex.42 Summa-
rizing the differing approaches, the Court noted, "[TJhe essential difference be-
tween the line of cases. that would invalidate the Gardiner marriage and the
line of cases... that would validate it is that the former treats a person's sex as a
matter of law and the latter treats a person's sex as a matter of fact. '43
The Court opined:
The district court granted summary judgment, finding the marriage void under
K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 23-101. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is
no genuine issue of material fact (citation omitted). Here, the parties have
supplied and agreed to the material facts necessary to resolve the issue. There
are no disputed material facts. We disagree with the decision reached by the
Court of Appeals. We view the issue in this appeal to be one of law and not
fact.
In a passage that is anything but clear, the Court then suggested that transsex-
uals are in a kind of legal limbo: "The words 'sex,' 'male,' and 'female' in
everyday understanding do not encompass transsexuals."44
However, without really addressing the more complex biological issues, the
Court concluded:
The plain, ordinary meaning of "persons of the opposite sex" contemplates a
biological man and a biological woman and not persons who are experiencing
gender dysphoria. A male-to-female post-operative transsexual does not fit
the definition of a female. The male organs have been removed, but the abil-
ity to produce ova and bear offspring does not and never did exist. There is
no womb, cervix, or ovaries, nor is there any change in his chromosomes.
45
Finally, the Court noted that the legislature is free to change the law on this
subject:
The legislature has declared that the public policy of this state is to recognize
only the traditional marriage between two parties who are of the opposite sex,
and all other marriages are against public policy and void. We cannot ignore
what the legislature has declared to be the public policy of this state. Our
responsibility is to interpret K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 23-101 and not to rewrite it.
That is for the legislature to do if it so desires. If the legislature wishes to
change public policy, it is free to do so; we are not.
46
Unlike the situation in Italy, there is generally speaking no distinction
throughout the United States between the legal consequences of a marriage per-
formed in a religious rite and one performed civilly. There remain in a few
jurisdictions some civilly recognized religious anomalies. In the United States,
42. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (Supp. 2001); In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.2d at 125.
43. Id. at 132-33.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 136-37.
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however, there are severe restrictions on what the states can do to treat mar-
riages differently, based upon religion, because of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Nevertheless, we see in Rhode Island the ability of
first cousins to marry if allowable within their religion, but not otherwise.47
Although there is no difference in legal effect from any other ceremony, Penn-
sylvania still authorizes the "Quaker wedding" in which a couple marries them-
selves without an officiating religious authority, such as a minister.48
Normally, once those who wish to get married have reached the age of major-
ity, generally eighteen (18), they do not need the consent of a parent to obtain a
marriage license to get married.49 The United States does not generally have
legally compelled publication of the intention to get married, nor does it provide
a mechanism for parents of adult children to oppose a marriage.
An interesting development, starting in 1997 in Louisiana, has been the no-
tion of "covenant marriage."50 This concept has now also been adopted in Ar-
kansas and Arizona.5' The covenant marriage statutes generally provide an
option for marrying couples to obtain pre-marital counseling, normally religious
counseling.5 2 The couples must also agree to enter into a covenant, whereby
they will be subject to a lengthier, and presumably more difficult, process if one
or both should later decide to get divorced, as opposed to if they had gone
through the normal marriage procedures.53 The rationale was that it is too easy
for couples, particularly young couples, to marry without adequate thought, and
that this haste gives rise to a high divorce rate.54 No matter what one may think
of this concept in theory, it is already fairly clear that it will have minimal, if
any, effect. In 1998, the first full year that covenant marriages were available in
Louisiana, there were 39,544 marriages in that state. Of those, a grand total of
609 were covenant marriages.55 The following year, 1999, which is the last
year for which statistics are currently available, even fewer couples opted for
covenant marriage in Louisiana; of 41,343 marriages, only 499 (or barely 1
percent) were covenant marriages.56 Thus, even if such a covenant were later
47. R.I. Gen. Laws §15-1-4 (2000). See also In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953).
48. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §1502 (2001).
49. Giendon, supra note 14, at 48.
50. LA_ REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (West 2001); see also Louisiana Embraces 'Covenant Marriage'
As Elective Alternative to No-Fault Divorce, 66 U.S.L.WK. at 2152, Sept. 16, 1997.
51. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-202 (Michie 2001); Asoz. REv. STAT. 25-901 (2001).
52. See, eg., LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 9:273(A)(2)(a) (West 2000).
53. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:307 (West 2000).
54. See generally Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and Le-
gal Implications, 59 LA. L. REv. 63 (1998).
55. STATE OF LOOrsANA DEP'T OF HEALIt AND HosprrAI s, CarcER FOR HBALI STATISTICS, 1998
ViTAL STATISTICS REPORT SUMMARY. Data provided by the State of Louisiana Department of Health
and Hospitals Center for Health Statistics (on file with editors).
56. STATE OF LOUISIANA DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HosprrALs, CaNTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, 1999
VITAL STATnSTICS REPORT SuaNvmARy. Data provided by the State of Louisiana Department of Health
and Hospitals Center for Health Statistics (on file with editors).
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found to be legally binding, which is far from obvious particularly if one of the
parties were to seek a divorce in another jurisdiction,57 it simply appears that
the option is so unpopular that it will have little practical impact.
IM[. THE STATE OF MARRIAGE.
A. THE ITALIAN CONCEPTION OF MARRIAGE.
Marriage can be defined as the legal union between a woman and a man, a
partnership for life or until its legal dissolution, which by its own nature is
formed and maintained for the well-being of the spouses.58 This definition re-
quires some thought on the nature of marriage and on the specific meaning of
the word "contract," when applied to marriage.
Certainly, the definition of marriage as a contract is common, as it belongs to
common law and civil law systems,59 as well as canon law.60 However, one
may question whether marriage can actually be considered a contract. In fact,
under general contract principles, no contract may be considered valid, and thus
binding, unless consideration exists.
It is clear that, in some cases, a marriage may involve people owning consid-
erable estates, and that there may be between them a "marriage of financial
interests;" however, the abstract notion of marriage does not envisage any eco-
nomic consideration. Otherwise, the validity of the bond would depend upon
the existence of said consideration. Therefore, according to this perspective,
marriage is not by its own nature a typical contract.
On the other hand, almost all legal systems provide for a marriage's dissolu-
tion, just as in the area of contracts, where, according to the applicable norms, a
judge may revoke a contractual agreement.61 In addition, a marriage can be
also declared null and void,62 and this fact may still be considered as consistent
with the idea that marriage is a contract, as it is quite clear that marriages can be
declared null and void.63 Therefore, our dilemma does not seem to find an
appropriate solution as to whether a marriage must be considered a contract.
In order to solve this problem, the perspective should be quite different from
the one stated above. This is because the definition of marriage as a contract
actually describes the specific requirement of marriage; and as is common to
57. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942).
58. See Bianca, supra note 12, at 31; BESSONE, supra note 3, at 3.
59. Arnaldo Bertola, Matrimonio (Diritto civile), 10 Novssvto DiGpEsTo ITALIANO 352 (UTET ed.,
1957).
60 MARIo FRANCUsCO POMPEDDA, STuD Im Dmr=O MATEmANIALE CMoNxco 166 (Giuffnt ed.,
1993),
61. See C.c. arts. 1453-1469.
62. Vincenzo Franceschelli, 1i Matrimonio Civile: Invalidita, 2 TRAITATO DI DMriTro PRIVATO 627-
28 (UTET ed., 1992).
63. See, e.g., Italy C.c. arts. 1418-1424.
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any contract, both parties' mutual consent is needed in order to enter into that
specific agreement.64 By stating that marriage is a contract, we refer to both
parties' agreement. In fact, applicable general contract norms are enacted to
protect an individual from binding oneself into any covenant that he or she may
choose. For instance, no marriage shall ever be considered valid or binding,
just as it happens under contractual theory, if either spouse was forced, lacked
capacity or the marriage was celebrated in jest.
We thus define marriage as a covenant between one man and one woman,65
where both parties are bound to mutual rights and duties. It is up to the parties
to make the marriage successful, since accountability for its failure on either
spouse may involve considerable economic and moral consequences. The eco-
nomic consequences may include court ordered support and property
obligations.
66
If marriage is a contract or a covenant, we must recognize some differentia-
tion between "marriage . and the act of becoming married."67 The latter
describes the moment in which the covenant is concluded, while the former has
a double, fundamental meaning. In fact, marriage here means both "the legal
status, condition or relation of one man and one woman united in law for life, or
until divorced," and "the act, ceremony, or formal proceeding by which persons
take each other for husband and wife." 68 However, note that the "act of becom-
ing married," (i.e. marital consent), cannot take place unless the required for-
mality or ceremony is performed. Thus, we have the important consequence
that the former takes place through the latter. No consent is possible unless
expressed in due form.69 That is not to say that the "act of becoming married"
and the "formal proceeding" are nothing but the same phenomenon: marriage.
Whereas the former concept focuses on the intentional change of personal and
social status, the latter refers to the formal act of consent, which constitutes
marriage.
Marriage should be considered from two distinct perspectives: public law and
private law. The public law view concerns the spouses' position with reference
to the public interest. This includes criminal law,7 0 the law concerning the fam-
ily's protection, tax law and, finally, welfare dispositions. The private law per-
64. BiANCA, supra note 12, at 32 ("marriage is a bilateral legal act, which is concluded by the
spouses' will expressed through the legal formalities.")
65. Id.
66. Francesco P. Luiso, 4 Dsarrro PROCESSUALE CIVME 263 (Giuffre ed., 1999).
67. TopRcNTE, MANUALE, supra note 10, at 822.
68. Id. at 822.
69. See Pasquale Colella, I Matrimonio Davanti a Minisnti del Culto Cattolico e dei Culti Ammessi,
2 TRATrATos Dmirro PRvAro 544-46 (UTET ed., 1992); Lucio Bove, Ii Matrimonio Civile: Condi-
zioniFfortnait Preliminari, Opposizione e Celebrazione, 2 TRATATO us Dmirro PRiVATO 613-16
(UTET ed., 1992).
70. See C.P. art. 570 (Italy Codice Penale) ("Whoever, deserting the family dwelling or, however,
indulging in a conduct contrary to family order or morals, neglects the assistance obligations inherent in
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spective regards spouses' personal and economic duties and obligations, whose
breach may lead to legal separation and divorce. It also relates to issues such as
ancillary orders on maintenance, property distribution (including pensions),
child custody, and support.
71
Breaking down centuries of marital supremacy within Italian society, Article
143 of the Civil Code72 provides a rather revolutionary family pattern by stating
that: "through marriage.. . [the spouses] acquire the same rights and assume the
same duties.. .."73 The husband is no longer considered the head of the family.
Rather, the whole of the familial unit is now intended as a partnership of lives.
As a matter of fact, both spouses are mutually bound to "loyalty, moral and
material support, cooperation in the interest of the family and cohabitation.
74
The duty of loyalty not only refers to its first evident meaning, the duty not to
engage in extramarital sex, but it also refers to all types of relationships that
may affect the exclusive nature of married life. Thus, this duty extends beyond
the commission of adultery; it prohibits a spouse from engaging himself or her-
self in an exclusive relationship with a third party, so as to deny the other
spouse the right to a true common life, in violation of Italian law.75
Although adultery cannot be considered a criminal offense anymore,76 it does
constitute a tort. The effect of this is that the offended spouse has a meritorious
cause of action for legal separation, and he or she may even demand it be de-
clared that the marriage breakdown's accountability be placed on the responsi-
ble spouse.77 The same type of petition, whose effects will be examined below,
can also be filed with regard to the violation of other duties, which will be
briefly illustrated as follows. First, the duty of cohabitation includes not only
the right to the sharing of lives within the same residency, but it also refers to
the "communio amoris" which is the natural right to a conjugal sexual life.78
Having said that, the spouse who wrongfully refuses either to live in the same
home with the other, or to have a normal conjugal life, equally infringes this
parental authority or in matrimonial status shall be punished with imprisonment up to one year or with a
fine from two hundred thousand to two million lire,").
71. ToiraNrre, MANUALE, supra note 10, at 847-67.
72. This statement reflects the amendments of Law no. 151 of 1970, which is mainly an application
of Article 29 of the Italian Constitution. It should be noted that it is this portion of the constitution that
has consistently been the basis of Family Law innovations contained in the Italian Civil Code.
73. For the translation of the hereinafter omitted Italian language, see MARTO BELTRAMO Er AL., THE
ITALiAN CIvIL CODE AND COMPLEMENTARY LeGISLATON (Ocenna Publications ed., 1991).
74. Cf C.c. art. 143
75. See Cass., March 28, 1987, n. 4767, 1987; Cass., July 16, 1987, n. 6256, 1987; ALFio Fi-
NOCCHIARO & MARIO FuNocc-nARo, RIFORMA DEL DIR1TTO DI FAMIGLIA 271 (Milano ed., 1984).
76. Articles 559 and 560 of the Criminal Code on adultery were declared unconstitutional, and thus,
have not been enforced. See Race. uff. 68-126 Foro It 1; Racc. uff. 69-147 Foro It I.
77. C.c. art. 151.
78. ARTuo CARLo JMOLO, I MKTImbomo 418 (UTET ed., 1961).
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duty.79 It is clear, however, that the spouse can legitimately interrupt cohabita-
tion any time it becomes intolerable or contrary to a child's interest.
Second, both spouses are obliged to cooperate in the family's interest80 and
to mutual support, both economic8' and moral, as an everyday effort to consti-
tute and strengthen their community of life. Marriage involves both personal
and economic consequences. The first consequence, generally represented by
the formula of "personal rights and duties," is to be intended and interpreted
according to the general principle of moral and legal equality of spouses. By
statute, spouses are mutually obligated to provide moral support and material
care, as well as to cohabit and to jointly decide matters concerning the family's
interests.82 This includes the duty of faithfulness, which concerns not only the
obligation to refrain from engaging in extramarital affairs, but also the duty of
the sharing of life.
The second set of consequences, i.e. economic consequences, vary according
to each European country, to the extent that some apply the presumption of
common ownership to both spouses' or either spouse's acquisitions from the
moment of celebration of marriage to its legal termination. Other countries pro-
vide for a system of separate estate, in which the single spouse's acquisitions do
not become joint property with the other spouse. In both cases, "European law"
generally leaves to both spouses the choice to maintain or change the above
presumptions.
In any event, each spouse is obliged to assist in the needs of the family ac-
cording to his or her own economic possibilities. Importantly, a spouse can
fulfill this obligation by work within the home.
As far as Conflict of Laws norms are concerned, both personal and economic
aspects of marriage are governed by the spouses' common national law and, if
different, by the law of the state where conjugal life is primarily located. In any
event, spouses have the right to choose to be subject to the national or residen-
tial law of either of them.
B. THE AMERICAN CONCEPTION OF MARRIAGE.
The American conception of marriage remained relatively static for the first
three quarters of the Twentieth Century. However, in recent decades, marital
rights and duties, in certain significant ways, have changed. Perhaps the most
profound changes have come about by virtue of federal constitutional recogni-
79. See Pietro Zatti, Diritti e doveri del matrimonio, 3 TRATTATO DI Dktrro PLVATO at 61-65
(UTET ed., 1992).
80. NATAijNO In, IL GOVERNO DELLA FAMGI-IA, I. Nuovo DIRITO Di FAMIOLIA 6 (Giappichelli
ed., 1976).
81. See C.c. art. 148 (The measurement of the spouses' contribution is "in proportion to their respec-
tive means, and according to their trade or household working ability.").
82. GAZZONI, supra note 11, at 353-57.
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tion of gender equality under the rubric of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States ConstitutionY3 Ironically, in a se-
ries of decisions, starting with the "conservative" Burger Court of the 1970's,
the Supreme Court struck down several state statutory schemes that tended to
treat wives as less competent or capable than their husbands. In the watershed
case of Reed v. Reed, the Court unanimously held unconstitutional a state law
granting preferential placement as estate administrators to men over similarly
situated women.8 4 Subsequently, the Court nullified a state statute that pro-
vided that only wives, and not husbands, were eligible for alimonyY-5 The
Court likewise held unconstitutional a statutory. scheme in a community prop-
erty state where the husband, as "head and master," had authority to unilaterally
sell or encumber the community property of the marriage.86 A provision in the
Social Security Act presuming that widows but not widowers are "dependent"
also fell to an equal protection challenge.
87
Thus, in the late Twentieth Century, the Court carried forward a process be-
gun by state legislatures in the Nineteenth Century with enactment of the Mar-
ried Womens Property Acts8 8 to end the common law myth of the lack of legal
identity (and therefore lack of rights) of the married woman.8 9 Of course, both
Congress and state legislatures also enacted a variety of statutes in the latter part
of the 20' Century to accord rights to married (and unmarried) women,0°
In other ways, the states moved to redefine marriage during the Twentieth
Century. Many states enacted rather misnamed "heart bahm" statutes, which
abolished such common-law torts actions as breach of promise to marry, aliena-
tion of affections, and "criminal conversation.
' 91
Of course, as in Italy, marriage in the United States is viewed as a contract
that is sui generis. It is a contract that requires the consent of the parties enter-
ing into it, and it is one that is highly regulated by the state. As opposed to
83. Gender-based discrimination by a state actor is subject to "'middle tier" scrutiny under the l4
Amendment. Had the states ratified the proposed Federal Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), it is almost
certain that strict scrutiny would be applied. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973)
(Powell, J. concurring).
84. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
85. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
86. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
87. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
88. Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together with
Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CoRmtL L. REv. 45, 61-63 (1981).
89. 4 WrauA BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIlES ON TIlE LAWS OF ENGLAND 430-432 (Facsimile of 1"
ed. 1765 1769, Univ. of Chi. ed., 1979).
90. A particularly important example is the Federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1691-1691f (1976).
91. See Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422 (Ky. 1992); Gilbert v. Barkes, 987 SW.2d 772 (Ky. 1999).
Other states repealed some of these causes of action by judicial decision, see Fadgen v. Lenkuer, 365
A.2d 147 (1976). A minorit of states continue to recognize certain of these causes of action. See
Emily Heller, North Carolina's Legal Heart Balm, NATIONAL LAw JouRNAL., July 30, 2001, at A6.
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general notions of freedom of contract, state law greatly restricts the ability of
marital contractors to elect the terms and conditions of their contract, especially
for terminating their contract. Justice Harlan, writing for the Supreme Court
three decades ago, noted:
As this Court on more than one occasion has recognized, marriage involves
interests of basic importance in our society. (citations omitted) It is not sur-
prising, then, that the States have seen fit to oversee many aspects of that
institution. Without a prior judicial imprimatur, individuals may freely enter
into and rescind commercial contracts, for example, but we are unaware of
any jurisdiction where private citizens may covenant for or dissolve marriages
without state approval. Even where all substantive requirements are conced-
edly met, we know of no instance where two consenting adults may divorce
and mutually liberate themselves from the constraints of legal obligations that
go with marriage, and more fundamentally the prohibition against remarriage,
without invoking the State's judicial machinery.92
The rights and duties within the marriage contract have not evolved at a con-
stant rate throughout he last century. Events and movements, such as World
War II (with millions of American women entering the workforce, at least tem-
porarily), the Civil Rights Movement and, of course, the Feminist Movement,
all played a role.
One supposedly fundamental marital duty, to engage in sex - normally per-
ceived as a duty of the wife (and a concomitant right of the husband) - came
under fire.93 Recognizing the harsh results, especially in situations where a
couple was separated, legally separated or in the process of divorce, or where
there was violence94 or threat of violence used, several states acted to limit or
abrogate the husband's exemption from rape laws.95 One particularly notorious
case, which generated tremendous publicity by the standards of the day, in-
volved a husband's unsuccessful constitutional challenge to a marital rape law
as violating guarantees of marital privacy and equal protection.96
Corresponding with the legal attack on a husband's unconditional right to
demand sex, came a rise in awareness of, and legal responses to, domestic vio-
lence. Pennsylvania was the leader among the states in enacting a statute that
allows one to obtain prompt injunctive relief in domestic violence situations.97
92. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 US. 371, 376 (1971).
93. See, Melinda S. DiCarlo, "The Marital Rape Exemption in Pennsylvania: 'With this Ring .
56 DicK. L. REv. 79 (1978).
94. We do not mean to suggest that rape, by itself, is not a crime of violence.
95. See Act of Dec. 6, 1972 Pa. Laws 1482, No. 334, § 1, repealed by Act of March 31, 1975 Pa.
Laws 985, No. 10, § 2 (Spec. Sess. No. 1).
96. State v. Rideout, 5 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 2164 n. 108 at 129, 130 (1978).
97. See Protection From Abuse Act of Oct. 7, 1976 Pa. Laws 1090, No. 218 (codified at 23
PA.CoNS. STAT. §§ 6101-6118 (West 2001)).
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Subsequently, Congress enacted federal legislation, the Violence Against Wo-
men Act, also addressing this scourge.98
Within the criminal realm, the notion of unity of marital partners continues to
evolve in other ways. Spousal testimonial privilege, once almost absolute, has
been subject to legislative and judicial diminution.99 In 2001, a federal appeals
court upheld prosecution of a wife for harboring her husband as a fugitive and
being an accessory after the fact to his violation of the Child Support Recovery
Act.10 The court denied her claims based on alleged rights of association, mar-
riage, privacy and due process.'1
IV. LEAVING THE STATE OF MARRIAGE.
A. DEVELOPMENTS IN ITALY.
Not surprisingly, given the overwhelming dominance of the Catholic Church,
legal divorce came late to Italy. The 1942 Civil Code made no provision for
divorce, and the dominant political party in the post-war era, the Christian Dem-
ocrats, opposed divorce as antithetical to the family "as a natural society whose
stability should be safeguarded by the indissolubility of marriage."1°2 Allied
with the Christian Democrats in opposition to divorce were the Monarchists and
Neo-Fascists.1 3 The Socialists, Liberals and all other political parties coa-
lesced to enact Law No. 898 of 1 December 1970, legalizing divorce. In most
instances, the Act required a five to seven year separation as a predicate to
divorce. "og
The Christian Democrats and the Catholic Church did not simply accept this
political defeat. They forced a popular referendum to abolish divorce, which
took place in the Spring of 1974. After a bitter campaign, the electorate Voted
to retain legal divorce by an overwhelming 59 percent to 40.9 percent.0 5 It was
not until 1987 that the period of legal separation prior to divorce was lowered to
the current minimum of three years.10 6 An overview of the current processes
for legal separation and divorce in Italy follows.
98. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322. Most of the Violence Against
Women Act remains intact today notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Morrison. See generally U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down certain civil remedies).
99. See, e.g. Commonwealth v. MeBurrows, 779 A.2d 509 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (providing a gen-
eral review of the law and holding that a spouse's observation of the act of another spouse is not, in
itself, confidential).
100. 18 U.SC. § 228 (2000).
101. United States v. Hill, 51 F.Supp2d 1091 (D. Or. 1999), aff'd 257 F.3d 1116 (9' Cir. 2001).
102. Valerio Pocar and Paola Ronfani, Family Law in Italy: Legislative Innovations and Social
Change, 12 L. & Soc'Y REv. 607, 618-19 (1978).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 619.
105. Id. at 621-22.
106. Roberta Ceschini, International Marriage and Divorce Regulations and Recognition in Italy,
29 FAm. L.Q. 567, 575 (1995).
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In the event of marital failure, legal separation is the first remedy as it is
intended both to declare the spouses' right to live apart and to regulate all con-
sequential matters)0 7
The second remedy, divorce, leads to marriage dissolution and, thus, to the
right to remarry. There are two distinct types of legal separation: (1) separation
by mutual consent; and (2) so-called judicial separation. These remedies have
two common aspects. They both require judicial intervention and must be
based on either the intolerability of joint life or the safeguard of a child's inter-
est. Actually, the formal basis of a mutual consent separation consists of the
filing of the petition requesting to separate,108 and therefore, no allegation as to
a petition's legal justification would seem necessary. In practice, Italian law-
yers commonly allege one of the legal grounds for separation to back up the
petition. This is because from an Italian jurisprudential standpoint, the funda-
mentals of the Italian legal system provide that no covenant can have a binding
effect, unless it is founded on a reasonable ethical or economic justification. 109
Therefore, no judicial remedy can technically be sought unless the petitioner
demonstrates a justifiable interest in obtaining it. 110
The first remedy, separation by mutual consent, consists of a combined pro-
cedure, whereby contractual and judicial aspects are both involved. In this pro-
cedure, both spouses file a joint petition containing their demand to be legally
separated according to the terms of their agreement. The terms of the agree-
ment are listed in the petition itself, and this will regulate each aspect of their
new stzitus (e.g., child custody, alimony, etc.). Once the petition is filed, both
parties will appear before the President of the Tribunal, or a Delegate Judge,
who, after the ritual attempt to reconcile the parties, will approve their agree-
ment."' A successive formal ratification decree will issue after 1-2 months
from the "Presidential hearing," thus rendering the separation definitive."
2
While separation by mutual consent can be considered a dispute resolution rem-
edy,113 in many cases, there may either be no agreement on the legal separation
itself or on its material conditions, and therefore, the party seeking to leave the
marriage is left with no other remedy but judicial separation.
107. C.c. arts. 151 & 155.
108. Cf C.c. art. 158; See BIANCA, supra note 12, at 166; Dogliotti, Alcuni Problemi Interpretativi
in Materia di Separazione Divorzio, 5 FAfcinnA , nurrro 479 (1997).
109. In practice, this is often referred to as "the causa." See C.c. art. 1322 (describing the principle
that a contract cannot be enforced unless the covenant "be apt to realize those interests which deserve
the protection of our legal system.").
110. See C.P.c. art. 100 (Italy Codice di Procedura Civile); SALVATORE SATrA & CAvMnEm PuNzl,
Dnrrro PRocassuALE CIVtLE 151 (Giuffrd ed., 1993).
111. Separation can be denied if the agreement affects the children's well-being, see C.c. art. 158.
112. BEssoNE, supra note 3, at 20511.
113. See BIANCA, supra note 12, at 175.
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According to the judicial separation procedure, one spouse files a petition to
the Tribunal indicating the grounds for separation, the specific court orders re-
quested, and the declaration that he other spouse carries the responsibility for
the marriage breakdown." 14 Once the petition has been duly filed, the President
of the Tribunal issues a decree indicating the day of the hearing.
At the hearing, the President, after attempting to reconcile the parties, will
issue a temporary decree providing for the following temporary measures:
115
the authorization for the spouses to live separately; and decisions concerning
child custody, support, 116 alimony 717 and possession of the marital house (usu-
ally awarded to the spouse who has custody of the child or children)."5s
This first step of the separation procedure is intended to provide an immedi-
ate response to the marriage crisis before the definitive sentence is rendered.
In fact, with the above decree, the President appoints an Investigating Judge
(or Giudice Istruttore, hereinafter GI), who has a diversified jurisdiction over
the case. He or she can take various types of evidence including: documents,
testimony and psychological evaluations of the parties or the children, or both.
The GI also has jurisdiction over the President's orders which, if there is new
evidence or new facts emerges, can be modified or revoked.19 It is clear that
the GI also has the power to issue new orders or confirm the old ones, if the
facts so require.'20
Once the evidence has been gathered, the GI closes the investigating phase,
remitting the parties before a panel of three judges (the President of the Tribu-
nal, the GI himself or herselft and another judge). Before a final decision is
made, the parties are allowed to present written and oral arguments.'12  The
final decision, immediately enforceable but subject to appeal, will provide for
the same matters regulated by the President and, eventually, the GI's orders.
114, Often times a comparative evaluation of spouses' behavior is necessary, see Cone di Cassa-
zione, January 12, 2000, n. 279. In any event, the accountable spouse is not entitled to alimony or to
inherit from the other spouse. Yet, he or she may still be entitled to child custody, depending on the
child's interests. See Cor di Cassazione, April 14, 1988, n. 2946.
115. See The decision on March 8, 1999, of the Tribunale di Taranto, printed in 4 FAmnLIA E
Dnnrro 376 (1999).
116. The spouse is obliged to child's support even when the latter has attained the majority but does
not have adequate means for self-support. No support is due when the child neglects to look for a job.
See Corte di Cassazione February 18, 1999, n. 1353, printed in 5 FAMoLIA E Dnsrrro 455 (1999).
117. See Corte cost., March 29, 2000, n, 3792.
118. Cf. Law no. 74 of 1987 (art. 8).
119. BassoNa, supra note 3, at 399-403; Fernando Santosuosso, Ii divorzio, 3 TaArrAxo Di Mrrro
PRiVATO 284-314 (UTET ed., 1989).
120. Csaaznto Mandrioli, Co Rso i Dmrrro PRocEssUALR CrvmLa 249 (Giappichelli ed., 2000).
121. C.P.c. arts. 275-282,
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Generally speaking, legal separation is a preliminary step to divorce itself; in
fact, three years of uninterrupted separation must then transpire before a party
may file a divorce petition.
122
There are, however, cases in which one might be eligible for divorce without
being previously separated, cases where either for personal reasons or because
of the couple's difficulties, public policy authorizes an "immediate" divorce
petition.123 Such fault-based grounds include the following:
(a) One of the spouses has been condemned to life imprisonment or to a
prison term exceeding fifteen years, whether by -single or multiple sentences,
even if the judgment concerns a crime committed before the marriage, or one or
more intentional crimes, provided that the sentence is final and not related to
crimes committed for political, moral, or social motivesP-
4
(b) One of the spouses has been condemned for crimes against sexual liberty
(a term used in the Italian Civil Code to refer to situations where a person's
freedom of choice with regard to sexual relations has been violated, such as
rape) or for inducement or coercion to prostitution and/or participation in, or
exploitation of, prostitution.1 25
(c) One of the spouses has been found guilty and sentenced in any way for
voluntary homicide of his or her child or for the attempted homicide of either
the spouse or the child.1
26
(d) In cases where criminal proceedings have been suspended due to the ex-
tinction of the crimes, such as by amnesty, pardon, or period of limitation, and
the court hearing the divorce case finds that enough evidence exists to support
the allegation that the offense was indeed committed.12
(e) One of the spouses has been condemned for aggravated assault or the
circumvention of an incapable, a term that means taking advantage of the lack
of understanding or experience of a person in order to induce him or her to
engage in actions, which are self-damaging. This category also includes certain
types of fraud. In order to obtain a divorce on this ground, the victim of the
circumvention must be either the spouse or child.' 28
However, there is an important caveat to the above grounds. Specifically, in
any of the cases in (a) to (e), the petition for divorce may not be presented if the
122. See Law no. 898 of 1970, art. 3, n.2.
123. See generally Andrea Russo and Robert E. Rains, The Reform of the Italian System of Private
International Law with Particular Regard to Donestic Relations Issues, 25 N.C.J. INT'L L & Com,
PaG. 271, 282-4 (2000).
124. Law no. 989 of 1970, modified by Law no. 436 of 1978 & Law no. 74 of 1987, art. 3, 1(a).
125. Law no. 74 of 1987, art. 3, 1(b).
126. Id at art, 3, 1(c).
127. Id. at art. 3, 1(d).
128. See id.
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applicant spouse has been condemned for cooperation in the crime or if the
spouses have resumed cohabitation.12
9
Moreover, an acquittal of one of the listed offenses does not necessarily viti-
ate that fault ground, inasmuch as additional related grounds include:
(f) One of the spouses has been acquitted of a crime listed under (b), but the
court establishes that he or she is unfit to resume the matrimonial
relationship.13o
(g) A person has been cleared or acquitted of a charge of incest because of
the absence of public knowledge or moral disapprobation, but the judge be-
lieves that this crime has occurred.'3'
Other grounds for divorce not requiring a prior legal separation are:
(h) The other spouse, a foreign citizen, has obtained an annulment or dissolu-
tion of the marriage and, notwithstanding the fact that such divorce or annul-
ment has not been recognized in Italy, has married again;1 32
(i) The marriage has not been consummated;133 and
(j) A declaration of change of sex has been issued and the period to appeal
has expired.13
4
The divorce judgment leads to marriage dissolution and - if relevant - to the
awarding of alimony, child custody and support and to marital home
possession.
As we have already seen in the field of separation, divorce can be obtained
through either a litigated procedure or by mutual consent. The basis for both
remedies is the impossibility of maintaining or reestablishing "the spiritual and
material communion between the spouses."'35
As far as divorce by mutual consent is concerned, there is not much differ-
ence between this procedure and the one examined already with reference to
separation. Both spouses file a joint divorce petition containing their agree-
ment, which can be different from the separation petition, on personal matters,
economic matters and, finally, on child custody. If the judge136 approves their
agreement, a divorce decree will be issued.
129. See id.
130. Id. at art. 3, 2(a).
131. Id. at art. 3, 2(d).
132. ldU at art. 3, 2(e)
133. Id. at art. 3, 2(f).
134. Id. at art. 3, 2(g)
135. Id. The party is eligible to file for divorce only when he or she can prove that a spiritual and
material common life between the parties no longer exists; but as one author stated, "the end of the
affectio coniugalis is implicit in the submission of the divorce petition to the judge." GAzzoi, supra
note 11, at 380
136. The wording 'Judge" here impersonally refers to a panel of three Tribunal judges. See, Law
no. 898 of 1970, modified by Law no. 74 of 1987.
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If no agreement has been reached between the spouses on the "divorce condi-
tions," a litigated procedure becomes necessary. The spouse wishing to divorce
files a petition, demanding marriage dissolution and, if relevant, awarding of
consequential orders on alimony, child custody and other related aspects. The
judge will then issue a decree setting the hearing for both spouses. At that
hearing, the judge will try to reconcile them and, if the reconciliation fails, an
ordinary judgment will take place,13' until a definitive divorce decree is
rendered.38
The initial judgment is appealable and it is not immediately enforceable.
139
Therefore, the spouses do not have the right to remarry unless the judgment
becomes definitive. During the whole procedure, the judge has full jurisdiction
to confirm, modify or revoke the judicial orders regulating petitioners' arrange-
ments.140 Usually, unless new facts arise, the "divorce judge" will confirm the
orders already issued at the time of separation.
Italian law provides for two different forms of marriage celebration: one
before the Civil Authority and one before the Minister of a Religious Author-
ity.' 4' In the first case, "civil marriage" can be declared void according to the
provisions of the Civil Code.142 However, this procedure is time-consuming
and it employs a strict statute of limitations that discourages a majority of eligi-
ble petitioners from seeking this remedy. 43
The procedure for annulment of Catholic marriages does not have the same
limitations. In fact, the rendering of a judgment does not usually require more
than three years, and no statute of limitations regulates the matter.
The proceeding is run by the Catholic Church's Judiciary and is governed by
the norms set forth in the- seventh book (second section) of the Code of Canon
Law. 44 The religious annulment covers a wide range of cases where, 45 for
instance, a spouse: did not have the right to marry,14 6 suffered from a mental
pathology or illness,147 or abused the institution of marriage.'48 This list is not
exhaustive and other cases do apply. "49 To be definitive, the annulment must be
137. PMRO PMARDI & EMANuELA CoLomBo, IL DtvoR2to NELLA GiURISPRtuDENZA 1216 (Giuffrd
ed., 1997).
138. Law no. 898 of t970.
139. This statement does not, however, apply to those orders which, by their own nature, require
immediate enforceability, such as in the case of alimony, child custody and support, among others. See
Santosuosso, supra note 119, at 333.
140. Law no. 898 of 1978.
141. GAzzom, supra note 11, at 317-22.
142. See C.c. arts. 117-124.
143. BIANCA, supra note 12, at 113-35.
144. Pio Vrro PINTo, IL PROcEssI NEL CoDIcu DI Dmrrro CANorco 473-549 (LEV ed., 1993).
145. Cf. POMPEDDA, supra note 60, at 3-508.
146. Cf. 1983 CODE c. 1055, § I (Codex luris Canonici (1983) (dealing with same-sex marriages).
147. 1983 CODn C. 1095, § 2 (dealing with mental defects).
148. 1983 CODE c. 1101, § 2 (dealing with simulation).
149. See FERNANDO DELLA ROCCA, DiRro MATRIMONIALE CANONICO (Cedam, 1992).
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pronounced by two conforming decisions on the same ground of nullity and
between the same parties.1 50
The right to due process is enforced by Section 1620 of the Canon Code,
which invalidates a proceeding where the defendant was not given the possibil-
ity to act or argue in his or her favor. Also, under Section 1644 of the Canon
Code, a new hearing of the case will be granted if the petitioner presents new
and conclusive evidence.'5'
According to the Treaties between the Holy See and the Italian Republic, the
definitive ecclesiastic decision can be enforced in the Italian legal system if it
meets the already examined requirements for recognition.i52 However, a for-
ral ratification procedure before the Appellate Court is still necessary to give
effect to the judgment.
Pursuant to a marriage annulment, both parties have the right to remarry and
no further alimony by the obligor is due, in consideration of the fact that what is
null and void cannot produce any legal effect.153 In any event, both the restitu-
tion of past alimony and child's legitimacy are not questioned by the ecclesias-
tic annulment sentence. 154
B. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES.
Perhaps the most critical change in American marriage law in the last century
started in California, with the signing in 1970 of the first no-fault divorce act by
the newly-elected conservative governor, later to be our first divorced President,
Ronald Reagan. 55 By 1985, the last hold-out state, South Dakota, had enacted
a no-fault divorce statute.1 56 As is now well understood, the essence of no-fault
divorce - that a marriage is unilaterally terminable - has had profound impacts
on the nature of marriage.57 Nevertheless, despite what one would believe
from the popular media, it appears that divorce rates in the United States have
in fact been declining over the two last decades158
150. 1983 CODE C. 1644.
151. See 1983 CODE c. 1620 & 1644; see also AuToa VAin, fL PRocEsso MAtRImONiALE CANON
ICO 797 (Nuova edizione aggiornata e ampliata a cura di P.A. Bonnet e C. Gullo, LEV ed., 1994).
152. Law no. 218 of 1995, aft. 64.
153. Core cost, June 11, 1986, n. 1905.
154. C.c. art. 128.
155. HE"RET JACOB, Swaar REVOLUTION, 43-59 (1988).
156. Id.
157. See generally LENORE J. WJTZMAN, Tm DIvoRcE RESOLUTioN: Tim UNE LECTED SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CONSRUQNECES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN (1985) (some of Prof Weitzman's most
disturbing statistics about the financial impact of divorce on wives and children have been unarguably
discredited); Richard R. Peterson, A Re-Evaluation of the Economic Consequences of Divorce, 61 AM.
Soc. R v. 528 (1996); Richard R. Peterson, Statistical Errors, Faulty Conclusions, Misguided Policy:
Reply to Weitzman, 61 Am. Soc. Rev. 539 (1996); Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economic Consequences
of Divorce Are Still Unequal: Comment on Peterson, 61 AM. Soc. REv. 537 (1996).
158. Ira M. Ellman, Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the Problematic Persistence of Traditional
Marital Roles, 34 FAm. L.Q. '1 (2000).
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Although one may describe modem state divorce laws in a variety of ways,
certain generalizations may be made. All states have one or more forms of no-
fault divorce. As noted, a no-fault divorce may be unilateral; that is, one spouse
asserts that the marriage is "irretrievably broken" (or some similar statutorily
mandated phrase) and that the parties have been living "separate and apart" (or
some similar statutorily mandated phrase), for at least a minimum prescribed
period of time.'59 Unless there is a genuine dispute as to the period of separa-
tion,1 60 the other spouse is unlikely to be able to persuade the court not to grant
a divorce by challenging irretrievable breakdown. Thus, even if the plaintiff/
petitioner spouse would have been found to be primarily at fault under the old
regime, and even if the defendant/respondent spouse is comparatively "innocent
and injured" and wishes to remain married, the divorce will almost certainly be
granted. 161
Like Italy, some states, such as New York, require a formal separation for a
period of time before entry of a no-fault divorce decree.162 Other states do not
even have the concept of "legal separation."163
A number of states also have a bilateral form of no-fault divorce in which
both parties consent to entry of the divorce decree.164 However, if the other
spouse will not consent, the unilateral form of no-fault, typically available after
a period of living separate and apart, remains available to the spouse seeking the
divorce.16 5 Thus, in such states, the non-cooperating spouse can only delay, not
prevent, entry of a divorce decree.
Finally, a number of states have retained traditional fault grounds for divorce,
while augmenting them with no-fault provisions.166 Such fault grounds, as a
practical matter, are seldom used today as the basis for divorce. Indeed, in
some states, they are statutorily disfavored. For example, in P~nnsytvania, in
cases where a no-fault ground is established, the court is prohibited from hear-
ing an alternative fault ground.'67
159. See UiNw. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT §302(a), 9B U.L.A. Part I, 1 (Master Ed. 1998).
Under the UMDA, the period of separation is 180 days. Id. In Penrsylvania, by contrast, this period is
two years, 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 3301(d) (2001). However, Idaho requires a separation period of five
years! IDAHO CODE § 32-610 (2000).
160. See Sinha v. Sioba, 526 A.2d 765 (Pa. 1987).
161. See, e.g., Desrochers v. Desrochers, 347 A.2d 150 (N.H. 1975).
162. See N.Y. DoM, Rm. LAW §§ 170(5) & (6) (McKinney 2001).
163. See 23 PA. CONS, STAT. §§ 3103, 3302 (2001).
164. See W. VA. Coon § 48-5-201 (2001); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3301(c) (2001).
165. See W. VA. CODE § 48-5-202 (2001); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3301(d) (2001).
166. See, e.g., W. VA. CoDE §§ 48-5-203 to 209 (2001).
167. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3301(e) (2001), overturning Restifo v. Restifo, 489 A.2d 196 (Pa.
Super. 1985).
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Nevertheless, fault in the form of marital misconduct can remain an impor-
tant factor in determining subsidiary issues, notably alimony.168 There is great
dispute among the states as to whether fault is a valid consideration in determin-
ing alimony. States that follow the UMDA explicitly preclude consideration of
marital misconduct in awarding or denying maintenance.169
As with entry into marriage and rights of the parties to a marriage, exit from
marriage has not escaped the attention of the U.S. Supreme Court. As already
noted, the Court struck down a non-waivable divorce filing fee which prevented
indigent spouses from seeking a divorce.170 The Court upheld, against a due
process challenge, a state's one-year residency requirement for divorce plain-
tiffs. 17 1 The Court has fashioned elaborate jurisdictional rules for entry of di-
vorce decrees and decrees over ancillary matters to enable those decrees to be
entitled to "full faith and credit" in other states.172
With the adoption of no-fault divorce laws, the states have had to grapple
with how, and to what extent, to provide economic protection for the jettisoned
dependent spouse. For example, this situation arises where a husband aban-
doned his housewife in favor of a new girlfriend and the marriage was for many
years (where the wife's job during the marriage was to entertain and to maintain
the marital home), or the marriage was not for many years but the wife's job
was to raise the marital children who are still young. The old fault regime
provided some promise (not always fulfilled) of economic protection for the
"innocent and injured" spouse. The erring husband could not obtain a divorce
without the jilted wife's cooperation; thus, she could name her economic terms
as his price for the divorce. In the brave new world of no-fault divorce, the
relatively innocent and injured spouse's bargaining power diminishes as the
requisite time period of living separate and apart nears. Once the spouses have
lived separate and apart for the required period, the innocent and injured spouse
can only fight a delaying action.
Thus, it was necessary for the states to examine and expand concepts for
economic protection of the dependent spouse. Since the dependent spouse was
also likely to be the custodial parent of any minor children, there emerged a
clear connection between ensuring such protections to the dependent spouse and
the best interests of such minor children.173
168. See, e.g., PA. CoNs. STAT. § 3701(B)(14) (2001). Fault, other than dissipation of marital assets,
is far less likely to be a factor in equitable distribution of marital property. See also 23 PA. CoNs. STAT.
§ 3502(A) (2001).
169. UaNr. MARRiAGE AND DrVORCE ACT § 308(b) (amended 1973).
170. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
171. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
172. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226
(1945); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
173. WErTZMAN, supra note 157.
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Accordingly, the states have had to address and modify provisions for ali-
mony and distribution of marital property. This has involved, and continues to
involve, a highly complex set of issues, the details of which are beyond the
scope of this essay.
With regard to post-divorce maintenance, many states expanded provisions
for periodic payments to the dependent spouse. This involved rethinking such
concepts as economic "need"174 and whether alimony ought be merely "rehabil-
itative" (i.e., for a short period to allow the dependent spouse to get "back on
her feet") or for an indefinite duration.'7 5 Some states, such as Pennsylvania,
only created provisions for post-divorce alimony when they adopted no-fault
divorce grounds.'76
Roughly concomitant with the adoption of no-fault came enactment of equi-
table distribution statutes in the common law property states. Prior to modem
notions of marital property subject to equitable distribution, title typically con-
trolled ownership (hence distribution) at the time of divorce. Since it was com-
mon for the working spouse (husband) to tide significant assets in his name
alone, this could lead to very harsh results.1 7  Under the currently prevalent
mandate that (most) property acquired during marriage is marital and thus sub-
ject to equitable distribution,'78 even such traditionally separate property as one
spouse's pension earned during marriage may be distributed between the
spouses. '
79
However, one very valuable asset of many marriages, the graduate degree or
professional license-of one party (typically the husband) acquired while the
other party provided support for the household, has been held in most jurisdic-
tions not to be marital property subject to equitable distribution.'80 Only New
York State adheres to the contrary view.'8' Some of the states adhering to the
majority view have crafted ameliorative doctrines such as "equitable reimburse-
mentf' to mitigate the result for the jettisoned, supporting spouse.'8 2 Neverthe-
less, the majority position excluding degrees and licenses from distribution has
been harshly criticized.183
174. Cf Ctapp v. Ciapp; 653 A.2d 72 (Vt 1994).
175. Cf Rainwater v. Rainwater, 869 P.2d 176 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
176. Act of April 2, 1980 Pa. Laws 63, No. 26 § 501 et seq. (codified at 23 PA.CONS. STAT. § 3701
(2001)).
177. Cf Fischer v. Wirth, 326 N.Y.S.2d 308 (App. Div. 1971).
178. Cf 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3501 (2001).
179. See Berrington v. Berrington, 633 A.2d 589 (Pa. 1993). Distribution of pensions is a highly
complex matter subject to both state law and federal law, most importantly the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1973 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq. (2001).
180. Cf. Hodge v. Hodge, 513 Pa. 264 (Pa. 1986); In re Marriage of Olar, 747 P.2d 676 (Colo.
1987).
181. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746 (N.Y.1985).
182. Bold v. Bold, 574 A.2d 552, 556 (Pa. 1990).
183. WErrzrAN, supra note 157, at 124-29.
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Unlike Italian law, American law does not generally distinguish between
civil and religious marriages at the time of divorce. A notable exception is the
New York state "Get" law which requires a party moving for a divorce to cer-
tify to the court that he has taken all other steps to free the other spouse to
remarry within the religion.114 This peculiar New York statute is aimed at re-
quiring religious Jewish men to obtain a "Get" from the rabbinate so as to allow
their ex-wives to remarry within Judaism. Even the commentary on this law
contained in the New York statute book suggests that it is of dubious
constitutionality.18 5
V. DrFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES.
Italy and the United States have traveled greatly different paths to their cur-
rent concepts of marriage and divorce. Italy, until recently a far more homoge-
nous and mono-religious society, largely adhered to the formal Catholic view of
marriage until late in the Twentieth Century. Then, with one leap, for good or
ill, Italy went from a system without divorce to a system with no-fault as the
dominant method of divorce.
By contrast, at least on paper, 86 the United States had a lengthy period of
fault-based divorce only, prior to its embracing of the no-fault revolution.
Clearly, the grip of the Church on Italian family practices has dramatically
loosened. As noted, Church opposition long delayed, but could not ultimately
prevent, the legalization of divorce in Italy. Despite the Church's emphasis on
marriage, the number of marriages celebrated annually in Italy dropped from
440,000 in 1947 to 306,000 in 1987.187 Similarly, in the United States, mar-
riages per 1,000 unmarried women age 15-44, fell from 149 to 91 between 1969
and 1988.118
Interestingly, while cohabitation of unmarried opposite-sex couples is in-
creasifigly common and accepted (or at least tolerated) in the United States,8 9
Italy has the lowest rate in Europe (9%) of men and women under the age of 30
cohabiting.19
By 1991, it was reported that over one-quarter of Italian marriages were cele-
brated in registrar offices only.191 Furthermore, Italian women, pursuing educa-
184. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney 1999).
185. N.Y. DoM. RFL. LAw § 253, Alan D. Scheinkman, Practice Commentaries at C253 1: Back-
ground and Commentary (McKinney 1999).
186. See MAx RHE-NSTEIN, MARIAGE STABILIY, DIvORCE, AND Tnm LAw, 256-60 (1972).
187. CHARLES RicHARns, THE NEw ITAkIANs, 141 (1994).
188. Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the Problematic Persistence of Tradi-
tional Marital Roles, 34 F~Mv. L. Q. 16 (2000).
189. JASON FiELDS & LYNNE M. CASPER, U.S. CENsus BuREAu, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND LIVNG
ARRANGEMENTS (2000), available at (last visited April 30, 2002).
190. The European Picture of Cohabitation, INT'L FAm. L., Nov. 2001, at 168-69.
191. RICHARDS, supra note 168, at 180.
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tion and careers, and delaying or avoiding marriage, have become notoriously
non-fecund. According to the World Bank, by the 1990s they were producing
an average of only 1.3 children, the lowest birthrate in Europe, and far below
the 1.9 average of American women.'92
Current data indicate that Italian children are still far less likely than Ameri-
can children to be raised in one-parent households. A recently released study
by the U.S. Census Bureau shows 1.1% of households in Italy to be single-
parent households, compared to a staggering 9% in the United States.193 In the
United States, "Single-mother families increased from 3 million in 1970 to 10
million in 2000, while, the number of single-father families grew from 393,000
to 2 million .... Meanwhile, the proportion of single-mother families grew to
26 percent and single-father families grew to 5 percent (from 12 percent and 1
percent, respectively in 1970)."194 Since single-parent households are usually
headed by mothers and are highly correlated with poverty and related social ills,
the continued increase in American single-parent households is appropriately a
matter of much concern.
Divorce rates in Italy have been a subject of concern there; after all, there
was no divorce prior to 1970. Yet, compared with the United States and other
Western countries, Italy's divorce rate is modest indeed. By the early 1990s, it
was hovering between 7 and 8 percent of marriages.1 95 By contrast, provisional
1998 data in the United States indicate a divorce rate of 4.2 per 1000 population
per year, or approximately 1,135,000 divorces in 1998.196 Obviously, one can-
not attribute the significant disparity between the high American divorce rate
and low Italian divorce rate to the availability of no-fault divorce in the United
States inasmuch as it is equally available (if generally slower) in Italy. Surely,
the lower marriage rate is a factor if the comparison figure is divorce per wo-
men, or both men and women. (That is, one cannot get divorced if one is not
married.) Yet, even if one only compares divorce rates per married couple,
divorce remains far more prevalent in the United States than in Italy. One can
speculate whether the "answer" lies deep in the American psyche, such as the
frontier experience of "moving on," or in the relatively secular nature of Ameri-
can society, or a host of other reasons.
Some, of course, suggest that the "ease" of no-fault divorce causes the high
American divorce rate. But then, how does one explain the comparatively low
Italian divorce rate, or the fact that the admittedly high American divorce rate
192. Id. at 137-38.
193. 1 -Parent Households Increasing, Tnt PATRIoT-NEws, Nov. 21, 2001, at A5.
194. JASON FIELDS & LYNN- M. CASPER, U.S. CENSUS BUR., AMERICA'S FAMIms AND LIVING
ARRANoEM rS (2001).
195. RICHARDS, supra note 168, at 14142; see also WILLIAM J. GOODE, WORLD CBANGEs IN I-
VORCE PATTERNS, 54-78 (1993).
196. NATIONAL CSTE FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, FAST STATS (2001), available at http:/i
www.cdc.govlnchs/ (last visited April 30, 2002).
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has actually leveled off or declined over the last twenty years? In the words of
Professor Eliman, "Indeed, the historical pattern in divorce rate trends is the
most persuasive evidence we have for why the law was not itself a major factor
for causing either the increase in divorce rates earlier in the century, or their
more recent decline."'197
If anything, Italian divorce law demonstrates that American divorce rates are
not caused by American divorce law. To the extent that Americans view our
divorce rate as a cause for alarm, we would do better to study Italian society
than revert to the regrettable days of fault divorce in the United States.
197. ELLMAN, supra note 159, at 3.
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